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In developed countries, old-age pensions and transfer payments to the working-age make up
the core of the welfare state. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) provide a detailed analysis of the
level and composition of social expenditures in OECD countries as well as a historical summary of
the trends. They document that the composition of public spending has changed considerably in
industrialized countries since the late 19th century. Until about 1960s, expenditure growth largely
resulted in an extension of government services and the formation of basic social security systems.
Direct or real government spending played a central role while cash transfers were of marginal
signicance. Starting in early 1960s, however, most public spending growth has been generated by
the expansion of social programs which have often taken the form of cash transfers. They explain
that, for the most part, this growth cannot be attributed to technical factors, such as declining
government productivity or aging populations, but is brought about by political decisions that
extended benets into universal social programs.
In high-income industrialized countries, besides the traditional old-age pensions, there is a
variety of income maintenance programs such as the provisions targeting disability, sickness, un-
employment, or injuries at work. Given this multiplicity of programs under one welfare state, it
is important to distinguish among various policy instruments according to the degree they pro-
vide redistribution and social insurance. Some programs are designed specically to target the
inequalities between the rich and the poor, while others aim to cope with variations in income
over the life-cycle. The seminal paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981) relates the overall size of
the welfare state to the degree of income inequality across agents in a median voter model. They
show that economies that display more unequal incomes will have larger welfare spending without
dierentiating between dierent income transfer programs. In this paper, we extend the Meltzer
and Richard model in several directions.
First, we acknowledge the variety of programs under the welfare state and model two dierent
programs simultaneously. One is the social security old-age pensions program, which is mainly an
intergenerational redistribution tool. The second is a transfer payment program for the working-age
individuals that redistributes income intragenerationally. We study the size of these two programs
under the welfare state by employing a political economy model with multidimensional voting.
Moene and Wallerstein (2001) claim that income inequality may shape alternative welfare pro-
grams dierently; they argue that political support for redistribution and social insurance depends
critically on the groups to which the benets are targeted. The simultaneous modeling of the two
1programs provides the opportunity to capture such dynamics.
Second, in our model, income is determined endogenously through labor supply and we allow
for distortionary eects of taxation. Third, for a given income distribution, we study the eects
of income mobility, in addition to the eects of income inequality, on the level of redistributive
taxation. In a recent paper, Kopczuk et al. (2010) use social security earnings administrative data
to study inequality and mobility in the US since 1937. They report that, since 1950s, earnings in-
equality has been increasing. They show that short-term mobility, dened as year-to-year mobility,
has been remarkably stable during the same period, for a variety of measures. However, they nd
that long-term mobility measures, reecting the mobility over the stages of the working life, have
substantially increased. They conclude that a comprehensive analysis of disparity requires studying
both inequality and mobility. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the rst to simultaneously
model the eects of income inequality and mobility on the demand for redistribution in a bidimen-
sional political economy framework. Using a three-period overlapping generations framework, we
investigate voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of tax revenues between these two
social programs. Not only the welfare state plays a signicant role in equalizing incomes across
groups and over lifetimes, but also income inequality and mobility have crucial implications for
redistributive policies.
We are not the rst to analyze the relationship between mobility and redistributive taxation in
a political economy framework. Lindbeck (1985) argues that, under certain conditions, even some
poor individuals may optimally choose not to vote for redistributive policies if they expect to climb
up the income ladder sometime in the future. This argument explains why we do not observe full
expropriation schemes in reality. Similarly, Piketty (1995) shows that personal mobility experience
shapes the voter's preferences for redistributive taxation. He claims that dierences in perception
about social mobility may generate dierences in welfare policies across countries. B enabou and
Ok (2001) formalize these insights with their so-called \prospect of upward mobility" (POUM)
hypothesis. However, the empirical evidence they provide indicates that the expected income gains
might be too small compared to the risks of downward mobility. This suggests that, at least in the
US, the demand for social insurance dominates the POUM mechanism.
In a series of papers, Alberto Alesina and his co-authors empirically explore the relationship
between the size of the welfare state and individual attitudes towards income inequality and mobility
(Alesina et al., 2004; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). They claim that,
in equilibrium, perceptions about income mobility can actually be sustained as self-fullling social
beliefs that aect preferences for redistributive policies. These papers use empirical tools to study
2the observed dierences in size between the European and US-type welfare states. The intuition
goes as follows: if Americans perceive themselves as living in a more mobile society where citizens
have more equal access to opportunities, then, in equilibrium, they will display a high eort level
and demand less redistribution. Conversely, in Europe, individuals may believe that those at the
bottom of the income ladder just happen to be `unlucky', leading to high levels of redistribution and
thus to distorted eort level. Therefore, in the absence of altruistic preferences, income mobility
may be perceived as a substitute for social insurance.
Alesina and co-authors, among others, have suggested that popular support for redistributive
programs may also arise as a result of altruistic motives. If the high-income groups in the economy
have a taste for fairness or social justice, they may be willing to accept redistributive taxation.
However, it is dicult to argue that popular support for large welfare programs is primarily mo-
tivated by altruism (Lindbeck, 1985). Individuals' attitudes towards redistributive programs may
stem uniquely from self-interested concern rather than a pure taste for fairness. There is indeed
empirical evidence that the rich do tend to vote for transfers when they are uncertain about their
future position on the income distribution, and, once the positions are established, the main motive
for supporting a welfare state is self-interest (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Beckman et al., 2004).
In light of this discussion, we pose the following question: if the agents are strictly selsh, how
can we explain the popular support for inter- and intragenerational redistribution? We suggest that
support for redistributive programs may reect the self-interest of the poor as well as the rich. In
fact, we are able to show that when income mobility is higher, holding everything else constant, the
rich demand higher transfer payments while the poor demand less. This is because, in our political
economy model, the decisive voter for the transfer payments program is a young individual for whom
uncertainty about lifetime income is a crucial factor in determining his preferences for redistribution.
Among the more productive agents, younger cohort demands higher transfer payments since they
are at risk of moving down the income ladder (prospect of downward mobility). A pension program
that provides mostly intergenerational redistribution, on the other hand, does not respond to
changes in expected income because the social security pension program is supported by the middle-
aged and elderly in our economy who have no uncertainty regarding their future position in the
income distribution.
The existing literature on the eects of income mobility on redistributive taxation considers
social spending as a total and does not dierentiate among various types of public spending. Our
paper makes an important point by addressing the fact that many dierent redistributive programs
are provided simultaneously. Thus, a more interesting question posed here is what the preferred
3policy mixture would be. The idea is basically that not only the extent of redistributive taxation
but also the optimal policy mix between diverse redistribution instruments may depend on income
mobility and other features of the income distribution. Hence, our work contributes to the literature
by investigating the eect of income inequality and mobility on the demand for two separate public
social programs.
A vast literature analyzes social security and other redistributive programs under the welfare
state using political economy models.1 While some of these studies do consider multiple issues
voted upon by majoritarian rule, their focus is not the eect of income mobility on redistributive
taxation.2 In order to nd the equilibria for the multidimensional voting game, we use the so-called
\structure induced equilibrium" (SIE) concept. This concept was introduced by Shepsle (1979) and
has been applied in the context of social security by Vincenzo Galasso and Ignacio Conde-Ruiz in
several papers (e.g. Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004; 2005; Galasso, 2008). The most relevant study
for our work is Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005) in which they model individual preferences over the
generosity of the social security system jointly with individual preferences over a transfer payment
program. They show that demand for each of these components depends on the proportion of the
elderly and income inequality. Their ndings indicate that coalitions may be formed the dimension
of age as well as income. They conclude that, in order to investigate the eect of income inequality
on the welfare system, one needs to study income distribution by age groups.
We extend the framework of Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005) with two redistributive instruments
to a three overlapping generations model in which we incorporate income mobility by introducing
individual shocks to labor productivity. We also improve upon their model by endogenizing labor
supply and saving decisions. Furthermore, we allow for consumption to take place in all three
periods as opposed to only during individuals' working life. The government taxes the labor in-
come of the young and the middle-aged individuals and uses these resources to nance lump-sum
transfers. Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005) dene the intragenerational component of the welfare
system as a transfer distributed to every working group irrespective of their income. In our model,
intergenerational transfers take the form of pensions to the old while intragenerational transfer
payments are made available to those with low incomes; thus, the latter display a stronger social
insurance feature. Consistent with the existing literature, our results indicate that the size of the
welfare system depends on both the age and the income dimensions. Our analysis oers the addi-
tional insight that income mobility plays a crucial role in determining the political outcomes in a
multidimensional policy space. Examination of the political equilibria in this economy reveals that
coalitions around the policy issues are possibly formed along three dimensions simultaneously: age,
4income, and future income prospects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce the model and describe
the economic equilibrium; in section 3, we present the voting game and then characterize political
equilibria based on the structure induced equilibrium approach; in section 4, we discuss the main
results of our model; and nally, section 5 concludes. All the proofs and derivations are in the
Appendix.
2 Economic Model
The underlying economic model is a modication of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) small open
economy producing a single commodity as outlined in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Consider
a stochastic overlapping generations framework where countably many individuals live for three
equally long periods. We label periods of life as youth (1), middle-age (2), and old age (3). For
tractability, the focus is on an economy with a linear storage technology. Time is discrete and goes
from 0 to 1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume no population growth (n = 0).3 Therefore,
in any given period t, there are an equal number of old, middle-aged, and young individuals.
Individuals work in the rst two periods of their lives and retire in the last. The labor supplied
by the young and the middle-aged is denoted by l1 and l2, respectively. The elderly do not work
(l3 = 0) and consume their retirement pension and asset income. A simple storage technology
allows to transfer the consumption good from one period to another: a unit of the consumption
good today is transformed into R = (1+r) units of tomorrow's consumption good. R is the interest
factor and r is the exogenously given rate of return on capital. Individuals can buy or sell assets
in the capital market at this interest rate. We assume that the economy is dynamically ecient,
i.e. r > n.
Individuals dier not only in terms of age but also in terms of their productivity. Individual
i, in his rst period of life, may be of a high (j = H) or a low type (j = L). The L-types are
less productive than the H-types, which is formalized as observable dierences in \eective time"
endowments (eH > eL > 0). Moreover, productivity is subject to an idiosyncratic shock over the
life-cycle, and the uncertainty about lifetime income is resolved as the agent ages. The productivity
shock is observed at the beginning of the second period of life and follows transitional probabilities




eL 1 1   1
eH 1   2 2
This matrix indicates that the conditional probability of being L-type (H-type) when middle-aged
for an agent who was L-type (H-type) when young is 1 (2). Formally, Pr[fe2 = ejgjfe1 = ejg] =
d, and Pr[fe2 = e jgjfe1 = ejg] = 1   d with j = L;H, and d = 1 if j = L, and d = 2 if j = H.
We assume that 1 > 2 > 1
2: the productivity level over time is persistent and the persis-
tence is stronger for the less endowed. Within each young and middle-aged generation, a constant
proportion, , is assumed to be L-type and the rest (1   ) are H-type. The average level of
productivity for each generation is given by  e = eL + (1   )eH. Since we assume a stationary
distribution of income (i.e. the probabilities are constant over time), it follows that, at the steady
state,  = 1 2
(1 1)+(1 2) with  > 1
2. Therefore, income distribution is right-skewed, i.e. median
income is lower than mean income, which is consistent with observed empirical regularities.4 The
ratios eL
 e and eL
eH are both measures of income inequality in this economy. We assume a constant
real wage rate for both generations and normalize it to one. Total labor income in each period t is
	t = 	1;t + 	2;t where 	1;t and 	2;t represent total labor income for the young and the middle-
aged, respectively. Note that total labor income is stationary over time and is equal to total labor
supply due to the normalization of the wages.
The government plays a purely redistributive role. We consider a welfare system that is com-
posed of two policies, both nanced through proportional taxes that are levied only on those who
supply labor at time t, i.e. the young and the middle-aged. The rst program distributes lump-
sum transfer payments, B, to the working L-types. This component of the welfare state is nanced
through a tax rate denoted by  and is an instrument to redistribute income intragenerationally,
from the H-types to the L-types. Income maintenance programs, such as the public assistance in
the US including unemployment insurance, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the food stamps, insure individuals against large
income reductions due to risks associated with human capital and random events (Hungerford,
2008). Following Lindbeck (1985) and B enabou (2000), we assume that private insurance markets
are absent. Given the variability of lifetime income, the transfer policy oers social insurance and
protects against risks that private insurance markets fail to cover.
As the second component of the welfare state, members of the old generation are entitled to
6old-age pensions, P, that are supported via the tax rate . The pension system plays two roles:
it is a means of both intra- and intergenerational redistribution. Pensions take the form of lump-
sum payment, and thus are modeled as a Beveridgean social security system. As Conde-Ruiz
and Profeta (2007) point out, in such social security systems with a weak relationship between
individuals' contributions and pensions, there is a relatively higher degree of redistribution within
cohort. By contrast, in a Bismarckian social security system, pension benets are strongly linked
to contributions, and thus the degree of within-cohort redistribution is relatively lower.5 Obviously,
these aspects of the welfare state have implications for political equilibria inducing voters to form
coalitions along the dimensions of age and productivity. In every period, the welfare state can be
described by a vector (B;P): transfers to the young and middle-aged, and pensions for the elderly.





Pt = t	t(t;t) (2)
(1) and (2) imply bidimensional voting on the tax rates t and t which in turn determine the
transfers Bt and the pensions Pt.
Preferences are additively time separable and agents value both periodic consumption, c, and
leisure, x. Consumption in the rst two periods of life enters into a logarithmic utility function,
U(c) = log(c), and linearly as U(c3) = c3 when old. As in Persson and Tabellini (2000), the linearity
of the utility function in the old-age consumption is imposed purely for convenience. This simplies
our computations by allowing for all income eects to be absorbed by old-age consumption. The
young and the middle-aged allocate their disposable income between current consumption and





l1j;t(1   t   t)   s1j;t + Bt if j = L
l1j;t(1   t   t)   s1j;t if j = H
(3)
where we denote consumption, labor supply, and savings of a j-type young individual in period t
by c1j;t, l1j;t, and s1j;t, respectively. Similarly, the budget constraint of the middle-aged in period





l2k;t(1   t   t)   s2k;t + (1 + r)s1j;t 1 + Bt if k = L
l2k;t(1   t   t)   s2k;t + (1 + r)s1j;t 1 if k = H
(4)
where we denote consumption, labor supply, and savings of a k-type middle-aged individual in
7period t by c2k;t, l2k;t, and s2k;t, respectively. Finally, for the elderly, we have c3;t = (1+r)s2k;t 1+Pt.
Preferences over leisure are represented by W(x) = log(x), where  is a utility parameter. Young
and middle-aged individuals are endowed with (1+ej;t) unit of eective time to be divided between
leisure and labor supply, so the time constraint is given by:
xj;t = 1 + ej;t   lj;t; j = L;H (5)
The timing of the model is as follows: each period agents make their labor supply and consump-
tion decisions knowing their current but not their future types. Next, people vote to decide on the
policy vector (;). Finally, taxes are paid and consumption takes place. This timing implies that
the young and the middle aged dier not only in terms of age but also in terms of the information
concerning their position in the future income distribution. Young individuals face uncertainty and
thus need to form expectations of future income conditional on their current position. The elderly
have no economic decision to make as they consume their entire wealth based on pensions together
with their lifetime savings and leave no bequests.
The young agents' problem at time t is choosing the optimum labor supply and consumption









where  2 (0;1) is the individual discount factor, and we assume, for simplicity, that it is equal
to the inverse of the interest factor:  = 1










Middle-aged agents face the following problem:
max
c, l
U (c2k;t) + W(x2k;t) + U (c3;t+1) where k = L;H (8)
It can be shown that there is a unique solution to agents' problem (see Appendix A.2 for the
derivation of economic equilibrium). Utility maximization yields the optimal level of consumption
c
1 = c
2 = 1 due to the quasi-linear utility specication. Optimal labor supply is given by l
1;t =
l
2;t = 1 + ej;t   
1 t t, where j = L;H.6 Total labor income, in equilibrium, is given by:
	(t;t) = 2(1 +  e)  
2
1   t   t
(9)
8Taxes distort labor supply for all groups; thus higher taxes imply a decrease in aggregate labor
supply. The aggregate feasibility constraint in this economy is:
(1   t   t)f[l2L;t + (1   )l2H;t] + [l1L;t + (1   )l1H;t]g
+ (t + t)f[l2L;t + (1   )l2H;t] + [l1L;t + (1   )l1H;t]g
= c3;t + [c2L;t + (1   )c2H;t] + [c1L;t + (1   )c1H;t]
(10)
We are now ready to dene the economic equilibrium for our economy.
Denition 1 For a given sequence of policies ft;tg1








t=0 such that (i) c
1j;t and l
1j;t solve the problem of j-type
young agent in period t; c
2k;t and l
2k;t solve the problem of k-type middle-aged agent in period t;
(ii) x
1j;t and x
2k;t are determined from (3), (4), (5); (iii) the government budget constraints in (1)
and (2) are satised; and nally, (iv) feasibility as in (10) holds.
In the rest of the paper, we consider the voting outcomes for this model and study how the political
equilibria relate to income inequality and mobility.
3 Voting Game
The policy to be voted upon is a bidimensional vector. This violates one of the main assumptions
of the median voter theorem, and thus it is well known that a majority voting equilibrium may fail
to exist.7 The implausibility of the assumption that the issue space is unidimensional has led to
alternative methods of aggregating preferences such as legislative bargaining, probabilistic voting,
and interest group models.8 We consider that the public social programs are decided through a
majoritarian voting procedure using the structure induced equilibrium (SIE) concept. There is a
process that aggregates agents' preferences over two issues (tax rates  and , in our case) where
political structures limit voting to only one dimension at a time.
We prefer the SIE framework to alternative approaches since it allows median voters' identities
to dier in each policy dimension. As Lindbeck (1985) points out, the redistribution programs are
all fragmented, and each group in the economy has dierent interests in dierent components of
the welfare state. This fragmentation basically allows politicians to extract votes from each specic
group by unbundling the issues: the identity of the median voter can be dierent for determining
separate components of the welfare state.
9Elections take place in every period, and all economic agents, regardless of age and income, are
involved in the voting process. All agents vote simultaneously and separately on  and . Given
that no individual alone can inuence the outcome of the political game, we assume sincere voting.
In other words, voters choose their ideal policies according to their true preferences, independently
of any strategic consideration. In order to analyze the political equilibria, we focus on the voting
game in a static environment with commitment as in B enabou and Ok (2001). Current voters, in
this case, are assumed to commit to future policies in a once-and-for-all voting game.9
We analyze the political problem of seven voting groups in this economy: young L-type (L),
young H-type (H), middle-aged L-type who was a L-type when young (LL), middle-aged H-type
who was a L-type when young (LH), middle-aged H-type who was a H-type when young (HH),
middle-aged L-type who was a H-type when young (HL), and nally the old (O). Obviously, three
overlapping generations, as opposed to two, display more interesting coalition formation possibili-
ties. In what follows, we drop the subscript t for ease of exposition unless necessary. The indirect
utility functions, V (;), for each of the groups whose political preferences we analyze are:
VL = logfl
L(1      ) + Bg + 1 logfl
LL(1      ) + Bg + (1   1)logfl
LH(1      )g + 2P
+logf1 + eL   l
Lg + 1logf1 + eL   l
LLg + (1   1)logf1 + eH   l
LHg
VH = logfl
H(1      )g + 2 logfl
HH(1      )g + (1   2)logfl
HL(1      ) + Bg + 2P
+logf1 + eH   l
Hg + 2logf1 + eH   l
HHg + (1   2)logf1 + eL   l
HLg
VLL = logfl
LL(1      ) + Bg + P + logf1 + eL   l
LLg
VLH = logfl
LH(1      )g + P + logf1 + eH   l
LHg
VHH = logfl
HH(1      )g + P + logf1 + eH   l
HHg
VHL = logfl
HL(1      ) + Bg + P + logf1 + eL   l
HLg
We examine individual preferences over the space (;) issue by issue. Following Shepsle (1979),
we assume agents express their preferences over  for a given level of  and then over  for a given
level of . With this Cournot-like procedure, we rst rank the preferences and identify the median
outcomes along these two policies, m and m. Then, using the systems of reaction functions,
we can identify the SIE of the voting game with commitment. We provide a full and formal
10characterization of the SIE with commitment in section 3.3 below.
Denition 2 (SIE) A structure induced equilibrium with commitment is a vector of policies (m;m)
such that m
t+1 = m
t = m, m
t+1 = m
t = m 8t and:
i) when the pension tax rate expected to be chosen is m, m is a Condorcet winner when voting
over the transfer taxes, and
ii) when the transfer tax rate expected to be chosen is m, m is a Condorcet winner when voting
over the pension component.
If preferences are single-peaked for each policy, then a SIE exists and is a median in both directions.
Thus, before proceeding further with our model, we need to ensure the existence of a SIE.
Lemma 1 (Single-peaked preferences) For a given , preferences over  are single-peaked, and
for a given , preferences over  are single-peaked.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The lemma above establishes that, given our assumptions, the conditions in theorem 3.1 of Shepsle
(1979) are satised for both  and .
3.1 Voting on the social security pensions
The old vote to have the tax revenue maximizing tax rate (i.e. argmax

	(;)). They are
a homogeneous group as far as voting is concerned: there is no political distinction between old
L-types and old H-types because heterogeneity does not aect their voting decisions. By setting
the tax rate to the maximum possible, old retirees are just maximizing their consumption since we
assume away any form of altruism. Furthermore, since they do not work, they do not pay taxes, so
there is no cost for them in setting a high  to nance the pension system. In other words, retirees
want to have this tax rate as high as possible because it does not impact their previously paid
contributions, but it does aect their pensions. This reects the widely known argument of the
\single-mindedness" of the elderly when they vote on social security (Mulligan and Sala{i{Martin,
1999).
For young and middle-aged individuals, the choice is not as simple. It depends on several factors:







H since both pensions and transfers are lump-sum and are
not contributory. Thus, the magnitude of tax distortion in each period is the same, regardless of
age or type.10 Their political preferences, instead, dier according to their current and expected
11positions in the income distribution. Formally, the young will choose the social security tax rate
that maximizes their expected intertemporal indirect utility function. The preferred tax rate for
the L-type young, 




= 2 [	 + 	] + (1 + 1)
	
2
  (1 + 1)l
L   (1   1)l
H = 0 (11)
where 	 denotes the derivative of the total labor income with respect to the pension tax. Analo-
gously, for the H-type young, 
H is dened by:
@VH
@
= 2 [	 + 	] + (1   2)
	
2
  (1 + 2)l
H   (1   2)l
L = 0 (12)
The terms in the two expressions above can be interpreted as follows: increasing  brings a future
benet when old (2 [	 + 	] > 0). All other terms in (11) and (12) above imply a cost in the
rst two periods of life due to social security taxation. Note that these costs are dierent between
the young L-type and the young H-type depending on their current income levels as well as their
heterogeneous income prospects.
















=  [	 + 	]   l
H = 0 (14)
The pension benet outlook is better for the middle-aged compared to the young due to the
proximity of the retirement period ( > 2). In addition, the costs associated with a higher tax
rate are lower for the middle-aged than for the young because the middle-aged pay taxes for one
last period only. Since pensions are not contributory, the preferred  for the middle-aged does not
depend on past productivity. This reects the sunk-cost character of the rst period payment into
the pension program. Although it is not possible to obtain a tractable closed-form solution for the
preferred pension tax, it is still possible to obtain a ranking. The following lemma establishes how
we can rank the ideal social security pension tax across all agents in this economy.









Proof. See Appendix A.6.
12The lemma above formally ranks all the pension tax rates. In particular, we nd that coalitions
are formed along the dimension of age when we consider the pension program. Within both the
young and the middle-aged groups, the L-types favor higher tax rates than the H-types since the
former are the net recipients from the pension program. The H-type individuals are better at saving
privately since we assume that the economy is dynamically ecient and the taxes are distortive.
Now we are ready to establish the median among the preferred pension tax rates.
Proposition 1 (Median voter over ) The median voter over the issue  is m = 
LL = 
HL.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Thus, the decisive voter over the pensions is a middle-aged L-type agent. This nding indicates
that coalitions based on age and income arise as in Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005).
3.2 Voting on the transfer payments
From the government budget constraints (1) and (2), it is clear that, for a given , the transfer
payments program would not benet the old. In fact, this program would reduce their pensions
by distorting the labor supply and decreasing the government revenues allocated to the pension
program. Therefore, the elderly oppose any transfer payments for the working agents, resulting
in 
O = 0. Similarly, the middle-aged H-types, both LH and HH, are net contributors to such a
transfer program. They would rather have taxes totally allocated to P rather than to B, yielding

HH = 
LH = 0. The rest of the agents, on the other hand, benet from this intragenerational
transfer scheme, especially the young who also value the social insurance aspect of this program.
How much they benet depends on their current type as well as on the income mobility prospects.
By maximizing the expected indirect utility functions of the young, we obtain the following two






= (1 + 1)
[	 + 	]
(1 + n)(2 + n)
+ 2	   (1 + 1)l
L   (1   1)l
H = 0 (15)
@VH
@
= (1   2)
[	 + 	]
(1 + n)(2 + n)
+ 2	   (1 + 2)l
H   (1   2)l
L = 0 (16)
where 	 is the derivative of the total labor income with respect to the welfare transfer tax.11 The
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   l
H < 0 (18)
The following lemma provides a comparison of preferred transfer taxes across groups.
Lemma 3 (Ranking of )



















Proof. See Appendix A.8.
The young agents, particularly the L-types, prot from the risk sharing component of this
program resulting in 
L > 
H. The prospect of upward income mobility is small for the L-types,
so their demand for redistribution is higher. The income mobility prospects induce the risk averse
young to partially smooth their expected income level dierences with the help of the transfers. The
groups LL and HL, on the other hand, are net receivers of transfer payments and thus demand a
larger transfer payments program. It is not possible to unequivocally rank the relationship between

LL and 
L. The comparison depends on the level of the initial endowment eH: if it is relatively
high (low), the upward mobility prospects are relatively better (worse), which would indicate that
the young L-types favor a smaller (larger) transfer program than the middle-aged L-types. It is
now possible to establish the decisive voter over this issue.
Proposition 2 (Median voter over ) The median voter over  is
(I) m = 
H if  < 3
4,
(II.a) m = 
L if  > 3
4 and eH > E,
(II.b) m = 
LL = 
HL if  > 3
4 and eH < E.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: middle-aged H-types and the old are always a natural
coalition against the intragenerational redistribution program. However, if the fraction of the
population with low productivity is relatively small, young H-types join the young and middle-
aged L-types, constituting the winner coalition in favor of this program. Most likely, the decisive
voter over the size of this program is a young agent. The novelty here is that, in addition to age
and income, the young's uncertainty over future position motivates redistribution.
143.3 Political equilibria
In this section, we describe the political equilibria. We have already characterized the political
preferences along each separate dimension in propositions 1 and 2. Since preferences are single-
peaked and the reaction functions have the single-crossing property, we can apply theorem 3.1 in
Shepsle (1979). The next proposition aggregates the preferences over the two dimensions of the
policy space and characterizes the SIE of the voting game with commitment.
Proposition 3 (Characterization of the structure induced equilibria) A structure induced
equilibrium is a vector of policies (m;m) such that:
(i) (m;m) = (
H;
LL) if  < 3
4,
(ii) (m;m) = (
L;
LL) if  > 3
4 and eH > E,
(iii) (m;m) = (
LL;
LL) if  > 3
4 and eH < E,
where E is dened in lemma 3 above.
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
This proposition indicates that multiple political equilibria emerge in this economy.12 Coalitions
around the policy issues are possibly formed along three dimensions simultaneously: age, income,
and future income prospects. When the share of L-types is relatively high, a coalition of young
and middle-aged L-types will emerge to try to obtain higher transfers. If the fraction of L-types
is relatively small, the preferred policies of the coalition of young and middle-aged H-types would
prevail. In the case of pension taxes, a coalition mainly based on age emerges. The elderly may
have signicant inuence in determining the political outcomes since they strongly support pension
provision. Nevertheless, the decisive voter in determining the size of the pension program is always
a middle-aged L-type. By contrast, the decisive voter for the transfer program is more likely to
be a young agent for whom income mobility is a critical issue. The fact that, for both programs,
the median voter is either a young or middle-aged citizen is consistent with the empirical evidence
(Galasso, 1999; Koethenbuerger et al, 2008).
4 Discussion
In this section, we provide two comparative statics exercises in order to investigate the properties
of the political equilibria. The rst one illustrates the eects of a productivity-neutral increase in
15inequality. In other words, we consider an increase in eH that is oset by a decrease in eL such
that the average productivity  e is unchanged. The second comparative statics exercise consists
of a productivity-neutral increase in mobility. We consider the scenario in which both 1 and 2
decrease such that the fraction of low productivity agents in the economy () remains constant.
There are at least two reasons to focus on the eects of productivity-neutral changes in inequality
and mobility on the SIE. One is to avoid any changes in overall productivity or labor income such
that the tax base stays the same (except for the distortionary eects of taxation). Second, this
approach allows us to keep the composition of the electorate unaltered since the population shares
for each group remain constant.
The two comparative statics exercises we carry out below are linked. In our model, income
inequality is dened by the eective time endowment dierential. However, inequality may be
more or less persistent depending on the level of income mobility in the economy. This is because
the variation in labor incomes over an individual's lifetime depends not only on eL and eH but
also on 1 and 2. Therefore, an increase in mobility may imply a reduction in lifetime income
inequality.13 In what follows, we analyze the eect of changes in mobility and inequality on m and
m. Given our assumptions above, the direct eect of changes in taxes on the government revenue
dominates the behavioral eect of such changes on the labor supply. Therefore, the total transfer
payment program size, as measured by 	(;), and the total pension program, as measured by
	(;), move in the same direction as the changes in  and , respectively (see endnote 9). In
each case, we also discuss how an increase in inequality or mobility might lead to a shift from one
SIE to another.
4.1 Increasing inequality
First, we consider an overall widening of inequality and analyze how the preferred tax rates
change. We carry out a classical ceteris paribus exercise in the form of a mean-preserving spread
in the productivity distribution. We introduce a decrease in eL and an opposite contemporaneous
increase in eH such that  e is unaected. For an arbitrarily small " > 0, if eH is increased to
f eH = eH +" then eL has to be decreased to f eL = eL  "1 
 , which implies that deL =  (1 
 )deH.
Both ratios eL
 e and eL
eH suggest an increase in income inequality in this economy. Let us rst
analyze the transfer payments program. We can write the indirect utilities dening the preferred
 as implicit functions of this tax rate and the parameters eL and eH, i.e.
V (;eL;eHj)  F(;eL;eHj) = 0 (19)
16These implicit functions are dened by (15), (16), or (17), depending on the identity of the median








where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. The sign of this expression depends on the identity
of the decisive voter (see Appendix A.11). If the proportion of the L-types () is relatively high, then
the median voter will either be a young or middle-aged L-type who prefers a larger transfer payments
program as a result of increased inequality. If the proportion of the L-types is relatively low, then
the median voter will instead be a young H-type who prefers a smaller transfer program. This is
because the H-types are net contributors to this program, while the L-types are net recipients.
Next, we investigate the eect of widening inequality on the pension program. The indirect
utilities dening the preferred  as implicit functions of this tax rate and the parameters eL and
eH can be expressed as:
V (;eL;eHj)  G(;eL;eGj) = 0 (21)
where the G function is derived from (13). Conditional on the equilibrium outcome for , total








It turns out that higher inequality leads to a larger social security pension program because the LL
group now faces even lower productivity, which means they are better o by supporting a larger
pension system rather than saving privately (see Appendix A.12). To summarize, depending on the
relative size of the low skilled population, a mean-preserving spread in the productivity distribution
implies a larger pension program while it induces a non-monotonic eect on the transfer payments
program. Given the logarithmic utility assumption, insurance is not a normal good in our model.
Therefore, wider income inequality implies that the redistributive aspect of government programs
dominates their insurance aspect.
4.2 Increasing mobility
The second comparative statics exercise we consider is a productivity-neutral increase in income
mobility. For an arbitrarily small " > 0, if 1 is reduced to f 1 = 1   ", then 2 has to be reduced
to f 2 = 2   "1 2
1 1 such that  remains unchanged. Therefore, we have d2 = 1 2
1 1d1. For the
17purposes of the comparative statics exercises, we can write any indirect utility dening the preferred
 as an implicit function of this tax rate and the parameters 1 and 2:
V (;1;2j)  Q(;1;2j) = 0 (23)









where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. It is possible to show that this expression is
negative if the median voter is a young H-type and positive if the median voter is a young L-
type (see Appendix A.13). Thus, an increase in mobility would decrease the preferred level of the
transfer payments program of the young L-type because higher mobility would encourage the L-
type to demand less social insurance. The young H-type, on the other hand, would prefer a larger
risk-sharing transfer payments program as a result of reduced persistence. This nding is in line
with B enabou and Ok (2001). In this case, neither the median nor the mean income are aected,
yet the demand for social insurance changes simply due to a change in expected incomes.
To analyze how an increase in mobility aects the pension program, we express the indirect
utility dening the preferred  as an implicit function of this tax rate and the parameters 1 and
2:
V (;1;2j)  Z(;1;2j) = 0 (25)









As expected, a change in mobility does not aect the size of the preferred social security pension
program as determined by the LL group. In fact, changes in mobility would not aect the size of
the preferred transfer payments program of this group either (see Appendix A.14). The intuition
relies on the absence of complete information on their lifetime income. In sum, rising mobility
aects the political support for redistribution to the extent that it reduces the inequality of lifetime
incomes. Therefore, the results in this subsection are consistent with those reported in the previous
one.
Finally, a few additional remarks are in order. Our comparative statics exercises abstract from
any changes in the identity of the median voter due to changes in income inequality and mobility.
18Neither the changes in inequality nor mobility can aect the identity of the median voter over the
pension program. The identity of the decisive voter over the transfer payment program, on the
other hand, might change if the increase in eH or the decrease in 1 is large enough. In particular,
with increasing income mobility, the young L-type agent is more likely to be the median voter
rather than the middle-aged L-type agent. This shift from one SIE to another is due to the change
in the ordering of the preferred transfer payment tax rates for these two groups (see lemma 3). The
intuition is again based on future prospects: higher eH and lower 1 both increase expected utility
for the young L-type, but not for the middle-aged L-type.
4.3 Voting without commitment
In the above analysis, the commitment assumption allows us to abstract from the complications
created by the dynamic nature of the voting game. However, the political decisions of the young,
the middle-aged, and the retirees may have reciprocal eects on each other. In particular, without
a device to commit to future policies, young members may refuse to politically support a transfer of
resources to older individuals since they are not guaranteed that this transfer policy will be kept in
place in the future. Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), among others, make this point which represents
an issue to most voting models of intergenerational transfers. However, when the model includes
uncertainties regarding future income positions, one needs to focus on voting with commitment
to maintain the political outcomes. B enabou and Ok (2001, p.454) point this out, explaining
that \mobility considerations can enter into voter preferences only if current policy has lasting
eects". They also provide a description of institutional motivations behind the policy commitment
assumption.
The repeated voting framework would be the same voting game described above, but each
period voters would determine the current size of the redistributive programs while perceiving that
their vote may shape future policy choices as well. Combining the game theoretic insights oered by
Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) on intergenerational implicit contracts with the equilibrium concept
introduced by Shepsle (1979), Conde-Ruiz and Galasso develop the concept of stationary subgame
perfect structure induced equilibrium in the context of social security models (Conde-Ruiz and
Galasso, 2003; 2004; 2005). The aim is not to characterize the full set of possible equilibria of
the repeated voting game, but rather to show that the political equilibria of the static voting
game would still be possible outcomes of the dynamic game without commitment. As Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso (2005) show, trigger strategies can be dened to sustain the equilibrium outcome of
19the once-and-for-all voting game as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated game.
Following this approach, our results could be extended to the case of repeated voting.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we pose the following question: how do income inequality and mobility aect the
demand for dierent redistribution programs under one welfare state? In particular, we consider
the allocation of tax revenues between pensions to the elderly and transfer payments to working
individuals. We allow for productivity dierences across members of the same generation. In
addition, we introduce individual shocks to productivity over lifetime which follow exogenously
given transition probabilities. We study the size of each component of the welfare state and the
implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance.
We analyze the outcomes of the voting game using the structure induced equilibrium approach
introduced by Shepsle (1979).
Our results indicate that the coalitions formed, and thus the resulting political equilibria, cru-
cially depend on the level of income inequality in the economy. As in Meltzer and Richard (1981),
a more unequal income distribution will very likely lead to higher levels of redistributive taxation.
Not only the dierences in current levels of income but also the expected lifetime income plays an
essential role in determining the demand for redistribution and social insurance. We show that an
increase in income mobility may inuence the demand for each component dierently depending
on the redistribution mechanism. In the case of transfers to the poor, the decisive voter is a young
individual who has incomplete information concerning his position in the future income distribu-
tion. Thus, higher mobility leads rich individuals to support higher transfer payments while the
poor demand less due to their improved prospects of moving up the income ladder. The pension
program, on the other hand, does not respond to variations in lifetime income. This is due to the
fact that the social security pension program is supported by the middle-aged and elderly who have
no concerns about their future positions in the income distribution. These ndings suggest that
while changes in income mobility may not necessarily aect the size of the welfare state, they may
lead to a change in the relative allocation of tax revenues across programs.
The model in this paper provides important insights into the phenomenon of the median voter
in the presence of multiple redistributive programs. Consistent with the previous literature, we
nd that both age and income are critical determinants of political preferences regarding each
redistributive component of the welfare state. The pension program providing intergenerational
20redistribution may be sustained by a coalition of the old and the middle-aged, as in the seminal
paper by Browning (1975). The transfer payments program, on the other hand, is supported
by a coalition of low income types, as in Tabellini (2000) and Casamatta et al. (2000). The
present analysis oers further intuition that income mobility plays a crucial role in determining
the political outcomes in a multidimensional policy space. We show that heterogeneity in future
income prospects play a key role in that the demand for social insurance responds to changes in
expected income even when median and mean income remain the same.
The model presented here could be extended in several ways. First, we assume that the income
mobility process is exogenous, and we do not model its sources. It would be interesting to analyze
to what extent income mobility is explained by job displacements or destructions due to structural
changes in the economy. Another possible extension would allow the labor supply to respond to tax
rates at the extensive margin as well as the intensive margin such that distortions in the form of
participation decisions could also be modeled. Similarly, one could study a setting where individuals
can alter their future positions through their educational choices to enhance their prospects of
upward mobility. It would also make the analysis richer to allow for a more realistic income
distribution by modeling income as a continuous variable. Other potentially useful extensions could
be the introduction of contributory benets rather than lump-sum ones and a more comprehensive
tax system that would also tax the interest income. These modications would induce additional
layers of heterogeneity in the voting behavior of the middle-aged.
It would be a useful exercise to gauge the relative eciency of the political process, however,
constructing the social welfare function in overlapping generations models is rather arbitrary. This
is because one would have to assign weights to each generation to reect their relative importance
which is a subjective call. Due to such diculties, our analysis remains silent on the comparison of
the equilibrium tax rates to the socially optimal ones. Finally, in this paper, we consider income
mobility as the income variability over an individual's lifetime. Analyzing intergenerational income
mobility would be an alternative approach. However, our main focus here is on social security
and redistribution programs, most of which are designed to shift incomes between dierent periods
of a lifetime or between contingencies (Osberg et al., 2004). Therefore, most of these programs
target temporary income uctuations over the life-cycle rather than income inequality in lifetime
incomes across individuals. It would be a natural extension to study how redistributive programs
may equalize long-term or lifetime incomes. We leave these possible renements to future research.
21Notes
1Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Galasso and Profeta (2002) provide comprehensive overview of this literature.
2For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Poutvaara (2006) investigate the joint determination of public
education and pension spending. Bethencourt and Galasso (2008) study health care and social security and show
that there might be political complementarities between these two programs.
3The appendix presents the analysis under a more relaxed assumption of constant population growth rate n  0
until the comparative statics exercises where we return to the assumption of no population growth.
4Creedy et al. (2011) report that the ratio of median income to mean income among 25 democracies around the
world in the early 2000s varied between 0.75 and 0.91.
5The within and across cohorts redistribution of income and risk by the welfare system has been studied extensively
by several others. See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Galasso and Profeta (2002).
6A sucient condition in order to ensure interior solution to the problem of the agent is that:   1      .
Holding everything else constant, individuals with high productivity choose to supply more labor than those with low
productivity since eH > eL. This is true for both the young and the middle-aged regardless of the tax rates. Also
note that, the labor supply of the middle-aged depends only on their current productivity and not the past.
7See, for example, Chapter 5 in Mueller (2003).
8See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of these methods.
9We focus only on interior equilibria of the voting game and assume that we are operating on the left-hand side
of the Laer curve, such that a tax cut would always lower government revenue (as in Tabellini and Persson, 2000,
Chapter 6, and in Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008). Formally, we have (i) for any given , 0 <  < argmax

	(;);











11From (16) above, it is clear that young H-type would not demand any transfers if he was certain that his position
in the income distribution will be maintained (2 = 1).
12Note that, case (iii) in proposition 3 by itself presents a situation in which multiple equilibria arise since the two
reaction functions overlap. Thus, this is not a full characterization of the SIE of the game (see also proposition 5.5
of Bethencourt and Galasso (2008)).
13As eloquently stated by Atkinson et al. (1992, p.6): \One of the reasons why mobility is of interest is that it
reduces inequality in the lifetime sum of earnings relative to that in a single period."
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25Appendix
A.1. Constant population growth rate
If population is assumed to grow at a constant rate of n  0, then the size of the newborn population
at time t is given by:
Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1 = (1 + n)tNo; No  1 (A.1)
It follows directly from (A.1) that in any period t, for each old individual there are (1+n) middle-
aged and (1 + n)2 young. Total labor income in every period t is given by:
	(t;t) = 	t = (1 + n)2	1;t + (1 + n)	2;t(1 + n)(2 + n)(1 +  e)  
(1 + n)(2 + n)
1   t   t
(A.2)
Aggregate income is stationary over time if we exclude the growth rate of the population. The
government budget for the transfer payments program can written in per capita terms as:
Bt =
t	t(t;t)
(1 + n)(2 + n)
(A.3)
while the one for the pension program remains the same as in the text (see (2)). Finally, the
aggregate feasibility constraint would be modied as:
(1   t   t)f(1 + n)[l2L;t + (1   )l2H;t] + (1 + n)2[l1L;t + (1   )l1H;t]g
+ (t + t)f(1 + n)[l2L;t + (1   )l2H;t] + (1 + n)2[l1L;t + (1   )l1H;t]g
= c3;t + (1 + n)[c2L;t + (1   )c2H;t] + (1 + n)2[c1L;t + (1   )c1H;t]
(A.4)
A.2. Economic equilibrium
To solve the economic problem of the young L-type, rst we need to write down his intertemporal










Using this, we solve for c3;t+2 and plug it back into (6). From the rst order conditions, we obtain
U0(c
1L;t) = U0(c
2k;t+2) = 1 which follows directly from our assumption about linearity of utility in
old-age consumption. Again from the rst order conditions, we have W0(l) = U0(c)(1   t   t).
Using the specic functional forms for U and W, one can obtain c
1L;t = c
2k;t+2 = 1. His optimal
labor supply is l
1L;t = 1 + eL   
1 t t when young, and l
2L;t+1 = 1 + eL   
1 t+1 t+1 when
middle-aged. The economic problems in (7) and (8) can be solved in a similar fashion.
26A.3. Conditions imposed on the parameters
First, recall that in endnote 6, we impose a sucient condition in order to ensure an interior
solution to the problem of the agent. We assume that, for any given tax rates  and , we have
  1      . In order to ensure W0 > 0 and W00 < 0, we need  > 0.
Second, for any agent, we want to have c
3 > 0; 8;. Recall that the agents choose c
1j = c
2k = 1,
regardless of their type. We consider an individual in the most unfavorable situation, i.e. the
L-type young without any redistribution program (B = P = 0). His lifetime budget constraint is














A sucient condition for this expression to be positive is eL > 1.
Third, we want to ensure that, for any given tax rates  and , the net income of the H-type is higher
than the net income of the L-type for both the young and the middle-aged, i.e. l
H(1      ) >
l
L(1      ) + B. This requires the following condition to be met for any pair of  and :
B < (eH  eL)(1   ) which can also be expressed as eH  eL >
l
H
(1 ). This means that income
inequality has to be large enough.
Note that these conditions imposed on parameters do not in contradict each other. To sum up, we
assume that for any  and :
(i) 0 <   1       to ensure W0 > 0 and W00 < 0 as well as an interior solution for optimal
labor decisions;
(ii) eH > eL > 1 >  to have an interior solution for optimal consumption decisions;
(iii) eH   eL >
l
H
(1 ), to ensure that the net income of the H-type is higher than the net income
of the L-type, for both the young and the middle-aged.
A.4. Proof of lemma 1: Single-peakedness and single-crossing properties of the
reaction functions






= [	 + 	] > 0 (A.5)
@VL
@
= 2 [	 + 	] + (1 + 1)
	
(1 + n)(2 + n)
  (1 + 1)l
L   (1   1)l
H = 0 (A.6)
@VH
@
= 2 [	 + 	] + (1   2)
	
(1 + n)(2 + n)
  (1 + 2)l
H   (1   2)l






=  [	 + 	] +
	
(1 + n)(2 + n)
  l
L = 0 (A.8)
27Finally, (14) remains the same as in the text. Note that a higher population growth rate n would
make public pensions more attractive because the same tax rate would then bring higher benets.
In order to show that voters have a unique preferred  and a unique preferred , it is enough to
show that the preferences are strictly concave in  for a given , and vice versa.
First, note that (A.2) implies 	 = @	
@ =  
(1+n)(2+n)
(1  )2 = 	 = @	
@ which is always negative.
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to  () yields: 	 = 	 =  
2(1+n)(2+n)
(1  )3
which is also always negative. Below we present the single-peakedness arguments for the young
L-type. The other cases can be derived in a similar fashion.
(i) Taking the second derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to , we get
@2VL
@2 = 2f2	 + 	g +
(1+1)
(1+n)(2+n)f	g < 0.
Thus, we have shown that VL is concave in  for a given  and can conclude that the preferences
are single-peaked in .
(ii) To show single-peakedness in , we need to take the second derivative of the indirect utility
function with respect to : @2VL
@2 =
(1+1)
(1+n)(2+n)f2	 + 	g < 0.
We have shown that VL is concave in  for a given  and can conclude that the preferences are
single-peaked in .
This concludes the proof of lemma 1. The single-crossing property holds, because for each possible
median voter, @V
@ is monotone in , and @V
@ is monotone in . 
A.5. Preferred policies
Once again, we present the case for the young L-type only since it is straightforward to apply the
same procedure to other cases. To nd his preferred tax rate L, we maximize his indirect utility





































Applying the envelope theorem yields:
@VL
@ = 2f	 + 	g + (1 + 1)
	
(1+n)(2+n)   (1 + 1)l
L   (1   1)l
H = 0.
This equation denes 
L. Analogously, 
L can be found by maximizing his indirect utility function





































28By the envelope theorem, this can be rewritten as:
@VL
@ = (1 + 1) 	+	
(1+n)(2+n)   (1 + 1)l
L   (1   1)l
H + 2	 = 0.
A.6. Proof of lemma 2: Ranking of 
In order to determine the ranking of preferred 's, we will simply manipulate the equations given
in (A.5)-(A.8) and (14). As expressed in (A.8) and (14), LL = HL and HH = LH. Given the
assumptions listed in A.3. above, we have eH   eL > B
1  . Simple algebra yields eH   eL >

(1  )2. This implies that the H-types prefer a lower social security tax rate compared to the
L-types, and this is true for both the young and the middle-aged. Thus, we have HH = LH <
LL = HL and H < L. Next, let us compare preferred pension tax between the young and the
middle-aged individuals. Note that each of the four equations ((A.6)-(A.8) and (14)) includes one
positive term ([	 + 	]) while the remaining terms are negative. To determine the comparison
across the terms in these equations, we start by noting that HH = LH > H. This is because the
net benet from the pension program is greater for the middle-aged H-type compared to the young




a reasonable restriction. Finally, note that the elderly are net recipients of this program (equation
(A.5) includes only a positive term) which is why they prefer the highest possible . 
Figure A.1 illustrates the ranking of preferred 's.
[Insert Figure A.1 here]
A.7. Proof of proposition 1: Median voter over 
When n > 0, proposition 1 can be restated as follows:
The median voter over the issue  is:
(1) m = 
HH = 
LH if  <  (n), and
(2) m = 
LL = 
HL if  >  (n),
where  (n) = n2+3n+1
2(n+1) .
Thus, the dominant coalition and the identity of the median voter depend on the proportion of
L-types in the population. Given the rankings for  as stated in lemma 2, we can analyze possible
coalitions. The population shares for each group is as follows: 1 for the old, 1(1+n) for the LL,
(1 1)(1+n) for the LH, (1 )2(1+n) for the HH, (1 2)(1+n) for the HL, (1 )(1+n)2
for the H, and nally, (1 + n)2 for the L. Recall that we have  = 1 2
(1 1)+(1 2) > 1
2. Simple
derivations yield that the median voter for  depends on how n2+3n+1
2(n+1)   (n) compares to . 
29A.8. Proof of lemma 3: Ranking of 
When n > 0, lemma 3 can be restated as follows:



















We can obtain the ranking of preferred 's by manipulating the expressions given in (15)-(18).
First, we start by noting that l
LL = l
HL, which implies that the preferred  will be identical for LL
and HL. The same argument holds for HH and LH since we have l
HH = l
LH. Second, since l
L < l
H,
the preferred  will be lower for HH and LH groups compared to that for the LL and HL groups.
Similarly, for young individuals, we know that the preferred  will be lower for H-types compared
to that for the L-types. It is also straightforward to show that LL and HL groups prefer a higher
 compared to the H group. The ranking between the young L-types and the middle-aged L-types




Figure A.2 illustrates the ranking of preferred 's.
[Insert Figure A.2 here]
A.9. Proof of proposition 2: Median voter over 
Under n > 0, proposition 2 can be restated as follows: (I) m = 
H if  < 
(n),
(II.a) m = 
L if  > 
(n) and eH > E,
(II.b) m = 
LL = 
HL if  > 





Given the population shares, the median voter for  will be the young H-type if the coalition
formed by young and middle-aged H-types together with the elderly constitutes the majority, i.e.




(n). If, instead,  > 
(n), then the median voter will be either the young
L-type or the middle-aged L-type, according to the cases listed in lemma 3. 
A.10. Proof of proposition 3: Characterization of the SIE
Proposition 3 can be rewritten as follows under n > 0:
a) (m;m) = (
H;
HH) if  <  (n),
30b) (m;m) = (
H;
LL) if  (n) <  < 
(n),
c) (m;m) = (
L;
LL) if  >  (n) and eH > E,
d) (m;m) = (
LL;
LL) if  > 
(n) and eH < E,




2(n+1)(n+2) , and E =
(1+n)(2+n)[1 (1 1)]+(1 1)(1  )( 1++)
(1 1)(1  )2 .
The proof for this proposition is a simple combination of the median voters along both dimensions
together with the properties of the reaction functions presented in Appendix A.4. In addition, we
have  (n) < 
(n), as long as n < 0:2, which is a reasonable restriction. 
A.11. Eect of rising inequality on 
The median voter over  can either be L, H, or LL. We will consider each of these one at a time.
For L, we have: F = (1 + 1)f2	+	
2 g + 2	 < 0. Now, we need to check the sign of
the numerator in (20). FeH = (1 + 1)
	eH
2   (1   1) = (1 + 1)1 
   (1   1) > 0 since
 = 1 2
2 1 2. FeL = (1+1)
	eL
2  (1+1) = 0. Therefore, the sign of (20) when L is the median
voter is positive.
For H, we have: F = (1   2)f2	+	
2 g + 2	 < 0. Now, we need to check the sign of the
numerator in (20). FeH = (1   2)
	eH
2   (1 + 2) = (1   2)1 
   (1 + 2) < 0 once we
substitute for  as above. FeL = (1   2)
	eL
2   (1   2) = 0. Hence, the sign of (20) when H is
the median voter is negative.
Lastly, for LL: F = 2	+	
2 + 	 < 0. Now, we need to check the sign of the numerator
in (20). FeH =
	eH
2 = 1 
 > 0. FeL =
	eL
2   1 = 0. Therefore, the sign of (20) when LL is the
median voter is positive.
A.12. Eect of rising inequality on 
The median voter over  is LL. From (A.8), G = f2	 + 	g +
	
2 < 0. Now we check the





 < 0. Hence, the d
deH > 0.
A.13. Eect of rising mobility on 
The median voter over  can either be L, H, or LL. We will consider each of these one at a time.






H) and Q2 = (1+1)
	2




2f	 + 	g   (eH   eL) < 0. Hence, the sign of d
d1 in this case is positive.














eH   eLg > 0. Hence, the sign of d
d1 in this case is negative.





2 . Thus,  Q1   (1 2
1 1)Q2 = 0. Hence, we have d
d1 = 0 in this case.
A.14. Eect of rising mobility on 
The median voter over  is LL. From (A.8), Z = G < 0. Now we check the sign of the numerator
in (26). We have Z1 = Z2 = 0 since  is kept constant. Therefore, d
d1 = 0.
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  Figure A.1: Ranking of the preferred 's and population shares
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Figure A.2: Ranking of the preferred 's and population shares
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